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This is a deeply flawed book, although it is not completely without merit. Mayer, who died (in January 
2014) as this book went to press, may have been an accomplished scholar of ecclesiastical history (1), but 
was a relative novice in Galilean scholarship. To explain and justify this judgment, I shall first highlight 
Galileo’s trial, then summarize Mayer’s book, and finally elaborate my criticism.
1. The Trial of Galileo: Highlights and Approaches
The trial of Galileo involved two sets of proceedings by the Roman Inquisition.(2) They began in 1615 when 
a Dominican friar filed a written complaint and another testified in person against Galileo. These friars 
advanced two principal charges, among many: Galileo advocated the Copernican doctrine of the earth’s 
motion, which they thought was religiously dangerous and probably heretical; and he defended this doctrine 
from the objection that it was contrary to Scripture, by means of arguments that involved novel exegeses of 
biblical passages and unorthodox hermeneutical principles. Indeed, the first friar attached to his complaint a 
long letter by Galileo to his former student Benedetto Castelli, in which Galileo defended the earth’s motion 
from the scriptural objection.
The proceedings were concluded in June 1633, with a sentence finding Galileo guilty of a religious crime 
technically labeled ‘vehement suspicion of heresy’; this was an intermediate transgression, short of the most 
serious crime, labeled ‘formal heresy’. According to the sentence, Galileo had committed the crime by 
writing and publishing (in 1632) a book entitled Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems, Ptolemaic and 
Copernican
; in it, he advocated the Copernican doctrine of the earth’s motion and implicitly denied the astronomical 
authority of Scripture.
What connects the two sets of proceedings is an order which Galileo received from the Inquisition in 
February 1616. In fact, in those earlier proceedings he was not prosecuted or even interrogated, for several 
reasons: his letter to Castelli was judged in its essence to reflect traditional Catholic doctrine; Galileo could 
not be found to have advocated the earth’s motion explicitly and publicly; and other more serious and 
theologically pertinent charges could not be confirmed. Instead, the Inquisition decided to privately order 
Galileo to abandon Copernican ideas, and he promised to comply. Another ecclesiastic decision was that in 
March 1616 the Congregation of the Index issued a decree, declaring the doctrine of the earth’s motion 
contrary to scripture, and temporarily banning Copernicus’s book On the Revolutions of the Heavenly 
Spheres (1543); but Galileo was not mentioned at all.
Now, for 16 years Galileo kept his promise, more or less, at least to the extent that no difficulties arose. 
However, the publication of the Dialogue reopened the proceedings. The reason why he published this book 
stems from the fact that in 1623 a cardinal named Maffeo Barberini was elected pope Urban VIII. Barberini 
was an admirer of Galileo, and had reservations about the 1616 decisions. In 1624, Galileo went to Rome to 
pay homage to Urban, and was able to have at least six audiences. From these discussions, Galileo got the 
impression that if he was careful and did not appear defiant, he could publish on the topic.
Thus, Galileo decided to write a book that was a critical examination of all the evidence for and against the 
idea. The arguments on both sides were presented, analyzed, and evaluated. He tried his best to carry out the 
evaluation fairly. The arguments for the earth’s motion turned out to be stronger than those against it, 
although admittedly not conclusive. This was at worst an implicit advocacy of the probability of 
Copernicanism. Galileo’s gamble was that friendly Church officials would not blame him for this, because 
they would recognize that his advocacy was not explicit or absolute, and so was within the spirit of the 
Inquisition’s 1616 order.
Galileo’s effort got him into trouble because of some issues pertaining to the precise wording and content of 
that Inquisition order. In 1632, a document dated 1616 emerged to the effect that the Inquisition’s 
commissary Michelangelo Seghizzi had ordered Galileo not to support, defend, or teach Copernicanism in 
any manner whatever. Galileo had been under the impression that the order was the one which had been 
conveyed to him by cardinal-inquisitor Robert Bellarmine; it stated that Galileo was not supposed to support 
or defend Copernicanism, but said nothing more than this. Seghizzi’s order was obviously more stringent 
than Bellarmine’s: a critical examination of pro and anti-Copernican arguments is clearly a manner of 
teaching Copernicanism (and so a violation of Seghizzi’s order), whereas it might not be regarded as an 
instance of supporting or defending Copernicanism (and so not a violation of Bellarmine’s order).
Galileo’s trial can be studied from several points of view: the history of physics and astronomy. since the 
earth’s motion was a key issue of the Copernican Revolution; methodology and the philosophy of science, 
since the denial of scientific authority to Scripture was an epoch-making principle about proper procedure; 
and general cultural history, since the episode embodies lessons about the relationship between science and 
religion (apparently implying their incompatibility).
2. Mayer’s Approach and Account
However, Mayer’s book approaches Galileo’s trial from the point of view of law, specifically ecclesiastic or 
canon law. For the episode was also a legal event. Mayer finds the relevant law to some extent in formal 
ecclesiastic decrees establishing the tribunal of the Inquisition and governing its procedures, but to an even 
greater extent in two other sources: inquisitorial practice as found in archival trial records and minutes of 
Inquisition meetings; and treatises by jurists and theologians attempting to clarify and systematize rules and 
procedures, and manuals by experienced inquisitors reflecting on their experience with the aim of improving 
practice and providing useful information to less experienced inquisitors.
Another aspect of Mayer’s method is the so-called prosopographical approach. He himself describes it (p. 2) 
as an emphasis on the biographies of the historical agents, aiming to ascertain their motives and thus help us 
understand the complexity of events.
Using these two approaches, Mayer elaborates a substantive account of Galileo’s trial that may be 
summarized as follows. Mayer uses as a blueprint the ideal type of an Inquisition trial, as one can reconstruct 
it from inquisitorial practice, scholarly jurisprudence, and ecclesiastical decrees. He is clear (p. 214) that 
such a ‘typical’ trial is a theoretical construct not likely to be fully instantiated by any actual trial, so that we 
also need to ascertain the actual proceedings of the real trial, and then compare and contrast the two.
Mayer distinguishes no fewer that eleven steps in a typical trial: (1) denunciation, by plaintiffs or witnesses; 
(2) preliminary investigation by officials; (3) citation of the accused or defendant; (4) further interrogation of 
witnesses; (5) formulation of charges; (6) ‘repetitio’, meaning re-examination of witnesses to clarify 
discrepancies or follow up newly-emerged leads; (7) defense by the accused or his lawyers, after they have 
been given copies of all testimony; (8a) consultants’ reports, providing expert (legal or theological) opinions, 
and (8b) ‘summarium’, meaning that the chief legal officer (called ‘assessor’) compiles a summary of the 
evidence, including important documents as attachments; (9) deliberation and verdict (including penalties) 
by the judges (in Rome, the cardinal-inquisitors presided by the pope), with the whole being written up in a 
‘sentence’; (10) abjuration by the defendant; and (11) ‘publication’ of the sentence, which usually meant 
merely reading of the sentence to the defendant at a private meeting with Inquisition officials, or at a public 
meeting in a church.
With some exceptions, Galileo’s trial fitted this scheme, according to Mayer. One exception is the complete 
absence of the repetitio step (no. 6). Another is the incomplete adherence to the defense step (no. 7), since 
Galileo never received written copies of the evidence. A third deviation is that the degree of publicity of the 
sentence (no. 11) was unprecedented, for in Galileo’s case copies were sent to all provincial inquisitors and 
papal nuncios in Europe, with orders to read it to all professors of philosophy and mathematics. Finally, 
during the 1633 proceedings, ‘Galileo’s trial went most seriously off the rails with Commissary Vincenzo 
Maculano’s extrajudicial move, apparently designed to secure Galileo’s admission of guilt’ (p. 216).
Now, with regard to these irregularities, Mayer is willing to call them ‘legal improprieties’ (p. 217). And he 
is even willing to blame them on the officials, on the cardinal-inquisitors, and most of all on pope Urban. In 
particular ‘Urban’s penchant for increasingly autocratic behavior, including his housecleaning of the papal 
administration beginning in mid-1632, and blithe disregard for the law … should not be downplayed’ (pp. 
217–18). However, Mayer is keen on pointing out that he does not include among the irregularities and 
improprieties one item that has been widely discussed and commonly alleged to constitute the main and 
most serious impropriety in the trial: commissary Seghizzi’s order, which emerged in 1632, which is found 
in a document dated 1616, and which Galileo (in the first deposition dated 12 April 1633) denied receiving. 
In fact, the main thesis in Mayer’s book is that Seghizzi’s order was really administered; that the 1616 
document where it is recorded truthfully reflects was happened; that it was legitimate; and that it ties 
together the earlier and later proceedings. This issue deserves further elaboration.
At a meeting of the Inquisition on 25 February 1616, Pope Paul V decided the following. Cardinal-Inquisitor 
Bellarmine should summon Galileo and give him the friendly warning to abandon the Copernican doctrine. 
If Galileo refused, then commissary Seghizzi should give him the formal injunction to abstain completely 
from teaching, defending, or discussing the doctrine. If Galileo did not acquiesce at Seghizzi’s injunction, he 
should be arrested and prosecuted.
At the following week’s Inquisition meeting (3 March), Bellarmine reported that Galileo acquiesced when 
he was given the warning to abandon the Copernican doctrine.
However, in the file of Galilean trial proceedings, there is a document dated 26 February 1616, stating the 
following: Bellarmine summoned Galileo to his residence and warned him to abandon the Copernican 
doctrine; immediately thereafter, commissary Seghizzi ordered Galileo to completely abandon the 
Copernican doctrine and to abstain from supporting, defending, or teaching it in any manner whatever; 
Galileo acquiesced and promised to obey.
Finally, there is another crucial document, a certificate written by Bellarmine for Galileo and dated 26 May 
1616. Its origin lies in the fact that rumors began circulating to the effect that Galileo had been tried, 
convicted, made to abjure, and given penalties; Galileo became increasingly disturbed by these rumors, and 
they may have also led him to wonder about the precise content of the Inquisition’s orders to him at 
Bellarmine’s residence. Thus, he asked Bellarmine to write a brief and clear statement of what happened and 
what the orders meant. Bellarmine’s certificate states that there was no truth to those rumors, but rather 
Galileo was only informed that Copernicanism was contrary to Scripture and thus could not be defended or 
supported.
Ever since these documents became accessible in the 1860s, scholars have discussed the issue that the 
Seghizzi injunction document seems to conflict with the other three: Pope Paul’s instructions, Bellarmine’s 
report to the Inquisition, and Bellarmine’s certificate to Galileo. From this conflict and other evidence, 
various conclusions have been advanced, which can be listed in the following sequence of decreasing 
strength or extremism: the Seghizzi injunction document is a forgery perpetrated in 1632; a forgery 
perpetrated in 1616; materially authentic but historically inaccurate; authentic and accurate but legally 
invalid. Some of these stronger claims, or some versions of them, were conclusively refuted already in the 
1870s, but other weaker versions are well-founded and may very well be correct.
Mayer rejects all such claims undermining the legitimacy of the Seghizzi injunction. Instead he argues that 
the document is materially authentic, historically accurate, and legally valid. His argument is based on a 
lengthy (pp. 80–120) analysis of the kinds of orders issued by the Inquisition, according to the legal practice, 
the jurisprudence, and the ecclesiastic decrees. This analysis tries to show that there was no clear distinction 
between the notion of a ‘warning’ and the notion of a ‘precept’. The critics presuppose this distinction when 
they argue that Pope Paul had ordered Bellarmine to give Galileo a warning, and Seghizzi to give him a 
precept if he refused the warning; and that Seghizzi deviated from the papal order when he administered his 
precept ‘immediately after’ Bellarmine’s warning, and thus without giving Galileo the opportunity to accept 
the warning.
And here we come to another part of Mayer’s argument, pertaining to the meaning of two Latin phrases. One 
is used in the February 26 document to connect Bellarmine’s action with Seghizzi’s. The phrase is ‘
successive ac incontinenti’, which is usually taken to mean ‘immediately thereafter’. In an erudite semantic 
analysis (pp. 67–71), Mayer argues that ‘the translation of successive ac incontinenti as “immediately 
thereafter” is open to doubt’ (p. 71). He does not explicitly tell us what it means, other than to implicitly 
suggest that it just means ‘thereafter’.
The other phrase occurs in the Inquisition minutes of February 25 that contain the pope’s instructions for 
Bellarmine’s initial action and Seghizzi’s possible intervention. The instructions stipulate that Seghizzi’s 
intervention is contingent on ‘if he [Galileo] refuses to obey’, which is the literal meaning of the Latin ‘
si recusaverit parere’. Mayer interprets this phrase in the weak sense meaning ‘if he is reluctant’ (p. 261, n. 
149), namely, if ‘Galileo objected is some way, perhaps in so mild a fashion as looking grumpy’ (pp. 73–4). 
This facilitates Mayer’s justification, validation, and legitimization of Seghizzi’s ‘precept’.
3. Criticism
In my judgment, Mayer’s argument supporting his key precept thesis is unconvincing. His semantic analyses 
strike me as arbitrary. His conflation of Bellarmine’s warning and Seghizzi’s precept seems to be a legalistic 
exercise that fails to take into account the different content of the two orders: not to advocate – presumably 
as true or as compatible with Scripture; and not to advocate in any way. Mayer also fails to appreciate the 
conceptual difference between Pope Paul’s conditional order (not to discuss) and Seghizzi’s order (not to 
advocate in any way, which would allow discussion aimed to refute). And Mayer tends to conflate and thus 
to equivocate among the material authenticity, the historical accuracy, and the legal validity of an order.
Moreover, Mayer fails to appreciate that Bellarmine’s report to the Inquisition and certificate to Galileo 
contradict the historical accuracy and legal validity of Seghizzi’s order. In this regard, he has a tendency to 
dismiss these conflicting documents arbitrarily. For example, he generally holds what may be labeled the 
Inquisition sloppiness thesis: ‘Ideally, the Inquisition under Urban and his brother Antonio’s guidance would 
have done its work more carefully … That it did not should cause no surprise. In sloppiness, creative record-
keeping, and inventive jurisprudence the Inquisition treated Galileo no differently than most of the rest of 
those who underwent trial before it’ (p. 5; cf. pp. 54–5). However, Mayer uses this sloppiness in a prejudicial 
manner, to apply it primarily to documents he wants to reject, and not to those he wants to accept.
This flaw with Mayer’s central substantive thesis is merely the tip of an iceberg of difficulties. Many others 
are methodological or more general.
Consider Mayer’s legal approach. Generally speaking, it is quite proper since Galileo’s trial is, among other 
things, a legal event. The legal approach is also valuable because it has been unduly neglected. However, 
Mayer betrays a constant mis-appreciation of previous scholarly contributions to the legal aspects of the 
episode. Three examples deserve mention.(3) Mayer has a half-page critical discussion (p. 118) of Léon 
Garzend’s 1912 distinction between a formal theological concept of heresy and a disciplinary Inquisitorial 
concept; but he completely misses its explanatory potential, especially to help solve the problem of what 
Mayer himself (pp. 3–5, 219–21) sees as the two main alternative interpretations of the trial, the precept 
theory and the heresy theory. And regarding another important legal contribution, by Orio Giacchi in 1942, 
Mayer mostly ignores his many insights; instead, he endorses one of Giacchi’s theses which is not only 
untenable but also perverse: that Galileo should have been subjected to actual torture, and the fact that he did 
not undergo such treatment was ‘the only serious irregularity’ (p. 205) in the trial. A third more recent 
scholar also receives shoddy treatment: Mayer frequently cites the works of Francesco Beretta and accepts or 
adapts many of his conclusions, but also criticizes him for at least two theses which he does not hold; one is 
a crass version of the precept forgery thesis (pp. 58–9), and the other claims (pp. 154–5) that the 
Inquisition’s assessor authored both parts (instead of only the first part) of a report on the Dialogue compiled 
in the summer of 1632; here we have Mayer twice committing the fallacy of straw-man criticism.
Additionally, Mayer’s legal approach is too one-sided: he displays an excessive neglect of the intellectual 
aspects of the episode.(4) For example, the book contains no explicit discussion of the content and structure 
of the Dialogue, which was the crucial work that triggered the 1632–3 proceedings. And concerning 
Galileo’s letter to Castelli, which occasioned the 1615–16 proceedings, Mayer does have a few pages of 
discussion (pp. 22–5), but it never rises above the level of free-association commentary and pseudo-
rhetorical analysis.
Thirdly, in his legal approach, Mayer seems to operate with a peculiar conception of law, which I would 
describe as hyper-legalistic, hyper-formalistic, and self-defeatingly meticulous. That is, some crucial parts of 
his account of the legal proceedings are such that the legal officials involved did not know what they were 
doing; and such an account strikes me as a reductio ad absurdum of his notion of what it is for a proceeding 
to be ‘legal’. Consider, for example, the 1616 Inquisition’s orders to Galileo: it was not just Galileo who was 
confused; according to Mayer’s own account, the confusion was also in the mind of the chairman of the 
Inquisition (pope Paul V) and of the most authoritative cardinal-inquisitor (cardinal Bellarmine); in Mayer’s 
own words, ‘by seeing that Galileo got both a warning and a precept, Paul V took no chances that he could 
wiggle out of papal clutches. Roberto Bellarmino gladly helped, acting on behalf of both pope and 
Inquisition in summoning Galileo. Paul and Bellarmino could be excused if they were somewhat confused 
about exactly what to do. The lawyers had not achieved much more clarity’ (p. 84). Or consider the 1632 
Inquisition’s order to Galileo summoning him to Rome: at the Inquisition meeting of 23 September 1632, 
pope Urban decreed to have Galileo summoned to Rome; two days later, cardinal-inquisitor Antonio 
Barberini, the Inquisition’s secretary and pope’s brother, transmitted the order to Florence’s provincial 
inquisitor; on the same date, cardinal-inquisitor Francesco Barberini, the Vatican secretary of state and 
pope’s nephew, with the help of a legal assistant, transmitted the order to the papal nuncio in Florence; in 
Mayer’s own account, they were all confused about whether and how Galileo was to be simply given a 
precept, or first an informal order and then a precept only if he refused; and so Mayer himself describes the 
whole situation as ‘tangled’ (p. 116), Antonio Barberini’s action as afflicted by a ‘discrepancy between 
decree and letter’ (p. 116), and the intervention of Francesco Barberini as a ‘disaster’ (p. 117) and a 
‘spectacular mess’ (p. 156).
The other part of Mayer’s method, his prosopographical approach, is also flawed, although in a different 
way. The point is that biographical information is valuable, but Mayer too often includes too many details 
that are irrelevant or distracting. For instance, the Inquisition meetings were usually held at the Quirinale 
palace when the pope once a week presided the meeting, or at the residence of a cardinal-inquisitor at other 
times; on 25 November 1615, it met at the palace of cardinal Paolo Sfondrato, concerning which we are told 
the following cultural-tourism trivia: Sfondrato’s palace is ‘the present Palazzo Sacchetti, one of the grandest 
in Rome, which shortly afterward sold for the colossal sum of 55,000 scudi’ (p. 43). Another example 
concerns Pietro Paolo Febei, who was appointed assessor by pope Urban in January 1633 to replace 
Alessandro Boccabella (whose surname means literally ‘beautiful mouth’); now, one detail about Febei is 
found by Mayer to be noteworthy, i.e., ‘he cut a good figure. In his home town of Orvieto, they called him 
“Bellafaccia”, “Pretty Face” ’ (p. 174); this enables Mayer to speak of a change from Boccabella to 
Bellafaccia (p. 173)! Finally, during the 1633 proceedings, some decisions suffered delays due to the fact 
that pope Urban spent a few weeks from late April to early May at the papal country residence of Castel 
Gandolfo; on no fewer than three occasions (pp. 187, 196, 198), Mayer feels the need to tell us that Urban 
was ‘purging’ himself.
There is another limitation of Mayer’s work that deserves mention. The issue involves archival research and 
is relatively arcane in general, but becomes highly revealing in the present context. The present context is 
one in which Mayer was able to exploit the fact that in 1998, for the first time ever, the Catholic Church 
regularly and generally opened to scholars the Inquisition archives in Rome, officially known as the 
Archives of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (the new name of the Inquisition). The single 
most important source of information is the minutes of Inquisition meetings, recording discussions and 
decisions. And the book’s endnotes (pp. 229–329) show that Mayer made a diligent study of them, 
constantly citing them. This is, of course, commendable and in some ways impressive. Now, for the study of 
Galileo’s trial, an even more crucial set of documents is the original manuscript proceedings, which have 
survived, and are kept in a different location, known as the Vatican Secret Archives (ASV). Despite such a 
name, the latter archives are also generally open to scholars with the proper credentials; they have been 
scholarly accessible for much longer than the Inquisition archives; and indeed Mayer also consulted the 
ASV. Of the many documents held in the ASV, the dossier of Galilean trial manuscripts is one of the most 
precious. The Church began to make it accessible to lay scholars in the 1860s, and as a result complete 
critical editions of the dossier were published, evolving with increasing editorial sophistication.(5) The 
dossier consists of about 228 folios, grouped into various bundles of folded sheets, some with writing on 
both sides, some on only one side, and some blank; these manuscripts accumulated as the trial proceedings 
occurred. Unfortunately, Mayer never consulted or accessed this original dossier, as he himself reports at 
one point: ‘The original is now in the Reserva of the ASV and allegedly inaccessible for consultation, 
although Frajese was allowed to see it after I made my request. The photocopy made available to me is 
useless for most questions of paleography and obviously all those of codicology’ (p. 255, n. 54). Frajese is 
the author of a book published in 2010, and holds a version of the forgery thesis regarding Seghizzi’s 1616 
precept to Galileo; and he does so in part based on his examination of the original dossier.(6) And Frajese is 
not the only recent scholar who has had access to the original dossier: Beretta has also done so; and the 
present reviewer can report having consulted it first in June 1986 and then again in April 2004. Mayer’s lack 
of access is consequential because direct access is crucial for the resolution of some issues, and even for an 
informed discussion of them. For example, apropos of the possible forgery of Seghizzi’s 1616 document, a 
first-hand examination of the handwriting in the manuscript is crucial (cf. p. 61); and it is important to also 
reach an informed conclusion about the fact that in the dossier, between the two folios on which the Seghizzi 
document is written, another folio has been cut out and disappeared; now, although the multiple paginations 
of the dossier exclude a 1632 forgery, they leave open the possibility of one perpetrated in 1616; however, 
not surprisingly, Mayer is completely unaware of this issue.(7) Moreover, apropos of the authorship of the 
two parts of the special commission report on the Dialogue in the summer of 1632 (mentioned earlier), it is 
important to examine directly the original handwriting as well as the water marks on the folio sheets (cf. pp. 
155, 304 n. 32).
One of the most damaging features of Mayer’s book is that his understanding of the Italian language seems 
inadequate and his translations of Italian texts are often inaccurate. For example, consider Bellarmine’s 
certificate, concerning which Mayer examines not only the final version, but also an earlier draft, in order to 
discuss the possible significance of the differences; one change involved the connectives used by Bellarmine 
to go from a description of what had not happened (a trial) to what had happened (a warning); the phrase ‘
ma si bene’ (meaning ‘but rather’) in the first draft was changed to ‘ma solo’ (meaning ‘but only’) in the 
final version; however, Mayer (p. 65) tells us that the earlier phrase means ‘but although’!!! Or consider the 
(already-mentioned) letter dated 25 September 1632 by Inquisition secretary Antonio Barberini to Florence’s 
provincial inquisitor, for the purpose of summoning Galileo to Rome to stand trial; the letter states that 
Galileo should come to Rome ‘per tutto il mese di ottobre’, which means ‘for the whole month of October’; 
Mayer thinks that Galileo is being ordered ‘to come to Rome before the end of October’ (p. 116). Finally, 
consider the letter dated 14 February 1633 by the Tuscan ambassador Francesco Niccolini in Rome to the 
Tuscan secretary of state in Florence: Niccolini reports that Galileo had arrived the night before, and that 
today he went to see the previous assessor Boccabella to thank him for his previous support and to seek 
advice; Galileo also went to see the current assessor Febei; and he tried to see but did not find commissary 
Maculano; however, Mayer tells us (pp. 175, 321 n. 166) that it was Boccabella who contacted and thanked 
Galileo, and who tried unsuccessfully to see commissary Maculano, and that it was Niccolini who had 
‘addressed himself to the new assessor’!!!
Last, but not least, there is a problem with the English language used by Mayer. It’s not anything stemming 
from inadequate linguistic competence; rather, it may stem from an opposite characteristic: a mastery so 
ingrained as to engender a total unawareness of the effect on readers of the writer’s many user-unfriendly 
stylistic practices. Their combined effect generates an idiolect which I shall dub ‘Pidgin English 2.0’. One of 
these practices is the ubiquitous usage of Latin words, such as: censura (censure), decretum (decree)
, denunciatio (denunciation), expeditio (concluding phase), monitio (admonition), praeceptum (precept)
, processus (proceedings or trial), repetitio (re-examination of witnesses), socius (associate), and summarium
(summary). Then there is the excessive use of Italian terms, such as: avviso (news or announcement)
, compagno (associate), fede (affidavit or certificate), giunta particolare (special commission), imbreviatura 
(abbreviation), nipote cugino (relative or second cousin), processo (proceedings or trial), sede vacante
(vacancy), and staffetta (courier). In addition, Mayer too often uses English words which are very rare, so 
much so that I am not embarrassed to report that I had to look them up in my unabridged English dictionary, 
for example: accrete, benefice, brevet, chirograph, doceur, fettle, feudatory, and sequela. Here, I am 
referring to terms whose usage could have been easily avoided, and not to technical jargon, which is 
unavoidable in almost all scholarship, for example (in this book): breve (official papal letter), fiscal
(prosecutor), precept (judicial injunction), process (for proceedings or trial), and rehabilitation
(commutation of some sentence or punishment). As if all these things were not enough, Mayer almost 
always gives hyper-literal translations whenever he quotes some original Latin or Italian passage; that is, 
even when they are essentially accurate, his translations are so literal that they are basically unintelligible to 
laypersons, and useless to specialists who know the original languages. Finally, to compound all these 
obstacles to normal reading, Mayer often includes (in parenthesis) the original Italian or Latin text, and he 
does so in the course of his exposition, although other times he relegates the original to the notes.
The general and methodological flaws illustrated above are not the only ones afflicting Mayer’s book. There 
are others which, while still general, are less important. Thus, here for lack of space I will just mention a few 
others, mostly without illustrating them, just as for the same reason in my critiques above I limited myself to 
just giving a few examples for each criticism.
The book displays a pervasive anti-Galilean animus, expressed in language that is emotionally charged and 
full of negative connotations. The clarity of the exposition leaves much to be desired, and frequently I had to 
re-read various passages to fathom Mayer’s unclear grammatical references and chronological sequences. 
Mayer completely skips any discussion of the period 1616–30, which is admittedly devoid of Inquisition 
proceedings, but contains important developments, such as: the 1620 Index decree detailing the corrections 
to Copernicus’s book; the 1623 election of pope Urban; and Galileo’s decision to write the Dialogue. Mayer 
practices without acknowledgment a questionable rhetorical approach: he often seeks to find in the texts or 
actions being examined instances of such things as the art of making the worse argument appear stronger, 
and the art of unscrupulously winning friends and influencing people; but he applies this technique one-
sidedly only to people he wants to portray negatively and texts he does not want to take seriously. Finally, 
this book contains more than a proper share of factual errors; for example, Galileo left Florence for Rome to 
stand trial not on 21 January 1633 (p. 173), but on January 20; and Giovanfrancesco Buonamici was not (in 
1633) Galileo’s ‘future son-in-law’ (p. 210), but rather was already (since 1629) brother-in-law of Galileo’s 
daughter-in-law.
In conclusion, this book displays considerable diligence in archival research; its legal orientation is 
potentially fruitful; its prosopographical approach provides useful information; and its central precept thesis 
is challengingly provocative. However, these are tiny merits that pale into insignificance compared to its 
numerous and deep flaws. These failings are such that laypersons and scholars can ignore the book, if they 
are trying to learn about Galileo’s trial. Nevertheless, a few specialists could benefit from it by exploiting it 
to sharpen their skills: how to interpret opaque texts, how to evaluate challenging theses, how to avoid 
historical and philosophical errors.
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